A year after Nasrallah’s death, Hezbollah is no longer the same

The death of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024 should have been a political earthquake. For decades, the Hezbollah leader embodied defiance: against Israel, against U.S. dominance, against domestic rivals.

His voice set the tone for war and peace alike in Lebanon. When Israeli airstrikes finally killed him in Beirut’s southern suburbs, many expected a regional firestorm.

That inferno never came.

Instead, the assassination — followed weeks later by the killing of Nasrallah’s heir-apparent, Hashem Safieddine — plunged Hezbollah into a year of shock, improvisation, and recalibration. The party, once the unrivalled centre of Lebanese politics and a feared regional actor, is now locked in a struggle not for dominance, but for survival.

A Red Line Crossed

Until October 7, 2023, even Hezbollah’s fiercest critics believed Israel would not dare to kill Nasrallah. His assassination was widely assumed to be the ultimate red line — a move that could trigger an all-out regional war. But the new strategic climate after Hamas’s “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack, and Israel’s brutal campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon, shredded those assumptions.

What Israel did instead was execute a decapitation strategy: first Nasrallah, then Safieddine, along with other senior cadres. For Hezbollah, it was not just a loss of men. It was the hollowing out of its command structure — the destruction of its brain and spine.

From Commanding Force to Cornered Actor

Hezbollah’s new secretary general, Sheikh Naim Qassem, lacks the magnetism and authority of his predecessor. Where Nasrallah once spoke with the cadence of a statesman-warrior, projecting certainty even in defeat, Qassem has offered a softer, more cautious voice. That shift in tone mirrors a deeper shift in substance.

The party no longer dictates the political agenda in Beirut. It no longer sets the rules of engagement with Israel. Instead, it has redefined victory downwards: survival itself is the triumph. The bar for success is simply remaining intact under relentless Israeli strikes.

The Raouché Rock Incident

If evidence was needed of Hezbollah’s shrinking power, it came in late September when supporters projected Nasrallah’s image onto Beirut’s iconic Raouché Rock. Once, such a commemoration would have been an untouchable show of force. Instead, it triggered outrage. The prime minister intervened, the governor of Beirut condemned it, and a political storm brewed.

That a symbolic tribute could escalate into a near-crisis underscored Hezbollah’s new reality: a movement once feared for its dominance is now contested even in gestures of memory.

Lebanon’s Patience Wears Thin

The other shift has been inside Lebanon itself. For years, Hezbollah justified its militarisation as Lebanon’s “shield” against Israel. But with the economy in freefall, the lira worthless, and daily life collapsing, many Lebanese no longer buy that bargain. Instead, they see Hezbollah as prolonging war and deepening the country’s isolation. The once-loyal allies are quietly drifting away.

The Regional Picture

Outside Lebanon, too, Hezbollah’s aura has faded. Once the “axis of resistance” counted on Hezbollah as its most disciplined, charismatic force. Today, regional calculations are being redrawn without assuming that Hezbollah can tip the scales. Even sympathetic governments, while still rhetorically supportive, treat the group less as an equal partner and more as a liability.

A Year Later

Twelve months after the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah is still standing — but as a diminished version of itself. The assassinations robbed it of continuity, charisma, and command. The war stripped away much of its deterrence. And Lebanese society, exhausted and fractious, is less willing than ever to carry the burden of open-ended confrontation.

The project has not collapsed. The movement is not defeated. But Hezbollah today is not the Hezbollah of yesterday. Its greatest battle now may not be with Israel, but with irrelevance.