Can Iraq finally bring all weapons under state control?

Recent announcements by several Iraqi armed factions declaring their willingness to place themselves under state authority have been presented as a significant step towards addressing one of Iraq’s most persistent challenges: the existence of powerful armed groups operating beyond the exclusive control of government institutions.

Yet behind the rhetoric, many Iraqi political and security observers remain unconvinced.

For them, the developments do not represent the dismantling of militia power so much as a recalibration of it. What is taking place, they argue, appears less like the end of Iraq’s parallel security structures and more like an attempt to adapt them to shifting political realities, growing domestic expectations and sustained international pressure.

The issue strikes at the heart of a problem successive Iraqi governments have struggled to resolve since 2003. While Baghdad formally possesses authority over the country’s security apparatus, the reality has long been more complex. A network of armed factions, many of them politically influential and deeply embedded within state institutions, continues to wield significant military, economic and political power.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has repeatedly pledged to ensure that weapons are held exclusively by the state and that security decisions emanate from a single command structure. Delivering on that promise, however, remains one of the most politically sensitive tasks facing his government.

The challenge is not simply military. Over the past two decades, armed factions have become intertwined with Iraq’s political system, developing extensive networks of influence that stretch across parliament, government institutions, security bodies and the economy. Any attempt to alter that balance inevitably carries consequences far beyond the security sphere.

Against that backdrop, analysts view the latest announcements with caution.

While the moves may provide Baghdad with temporary political breathing space, particularly amid continuing American pressure to curb the influence of armed groups, they do not necessarily indicate that those factions are prepared to surrender the sources of their power.

Washington’s position has remained largely consistent. American officials have repeatedly signalled that integrating armed groups into official structures or rebranding their status is not, in itself, sufficient. What matters, from the US perspective, is the dismantling of independent military chains of command and the consolidation of authority under state institutions.

It is precisely this issue that has raised questions over the recent announcement by Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, that it was severing its ties with the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and placing all of its personnel and resources under the authority of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The declaration immediately exposed a central contradiction.

The PMF is itself recognised by the Iraqi state as an official security institution funded through the national budget and operating under government authority. Critics therefore questioned what practical difference exists between leaving one state-affiliated structure and joining another.

To many observers, the answer is not entirely clear.

The move appears unlikely to alter the faction’s leadership structure, internal discipline, ideological identity or networks of influence. Instead, analysts suggest it may offer a politically useful framework through which armed groups can respond to external scrutiny without fundamentally changing how they operate.

The political dimension is equally significant.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq remains one of the most influential components of the Shiite Coordination Framework, the coalition that dominates Iraq’s governing landscape. Al-Khazali himself continues to play a prominent role in Iraqi politics, making it difficult to separate questions of security reform from the broader calculations of political power.

Similar doubts have accompanied the latest decisions concerning Saraya al-Salam, the armed formation associated with Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

Supporters have portrayed the move as another step towards strengthening state authority. Critics, however, point out that the group has previously been declared dissolved more than once, including in 2017 and 2019, without disappearing from the Iraqi scene.

That history has led many to question whether the latest announcements represent a genuine break with the past or merely another chapter in a familiar cycle of restructuring and rebranding.

For some Iraqi politicians, the most likely outcome is administrative rather than transformational. Uniforms may change, organisational titles may be revised and formal affiliations may be redefined, but the deeper structures of loyalty and command could remain intact.

Such concerns reflect a broader reality. The issue is not simply whether fighters receive salaries from the state or hold official ranks. The more important question is where ultimate authority resides when critical military or political decisions are made.

Recent statements from faction representatives have done little to dispel these doubts.

Firas Yasser, a member of the political bureau of Harakat al-Nujaba, insisted that the measures under discussion do not affect what factions refer to as the “weapons of the resistance”. He argued that the debate itself is not new, noting that the Popular Mobilisation Forces already fall under the authority of the commander-in-chief.

His remarks were notable because Harakat al-Nujaba is among the factions said to be participating in the broader process of alignment with the state. Yet the language employed by its representatives suggests that the concept of surrendering weapons remains fundamentally different from the concept of administrative integration.

An even clearer position emerged from Kazem al-Fartousi, spokesperson for Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, who stated openly that his faction would not relinquish its weapons and would continue operating outside the government’s framework.

He justified that stance by pointing to the continued presence of American forces in Iraq.

Such statements illustrate one of the central obstacles confronting any effort to establish a state monopoly on force. For several factions, the question of disarmament is tied not only to domestic politics but also to wider regional and geopolitical considerations. As long as those groups perceive external threats to persist, many are unlikely to view surrendering their weapons as an option.

For now, the gap between political declarations and practical realities remains considerable.

The latest announcements may help ease pressure on Baghdad and signal a willingness to engage with demands for reform. They may also provide the government with an opportunity to demonstrate progress on one of its most sensitive policy files.

But there is little evidence, at least so far, that Iraq is witnessing a fundamental transformation in the structure of armed power.

The real test lies not in declarations, legal classifications or institutional affiliations. It lies in whether the Iraqi state can ultimately ensure that every armed actor answers to a single chain of command and that decisions regarding the use of force are made exclusively through official institutions.

Until that happens, many observers believe Iraq’s long-running debate over weapons outside state control will remain unresolved, regardless of how often the organisations carrying those weapons change their names, uniforms or administrative status.